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Abstract 
The concept of strategic culture promises to offer causal, non-materialist explanations of 
state behaviour, but it adheres to incommensurable explanatory modes of investigation. 
Outdated mechanistic concepts of strategic culture still inform many descriptions concerning 
the use of force. Offering a discursive alternative to contextual strategic culture, this article 
defends a version of practice theory. It intends to empirically show its superiority over 
contextual understandings of culture, as well as the limits involved. In doing so, it describes a 
movement away from congealed structure to social structures, and from discourse towards 
optimal agency in discursive practices, involving doctrine and civil military relations.  
This movement can be seen as a wider development within debates on culture. It is argued 
here that an oppositional view of structure and agency will be unproductive. Strategic culture 
can be operationalized when defined as the discursive interplay between grand strategy as a 
discourse and relevant strategic practices. Applied to the British military intervention of 
Sierra Leone in 2000, the model shows that practices crucially affected hesitant political 
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Introduction: The Lure of a British Way of War 
Strategic culture has traditionally been likened to stable national views of the use of force, an 
understanding harking back to geographical, historical and political experiences and 
structures. (Gray, 1999; Booth & Trood, 1999) The flaws of such mechanistic applications of 
strategic culture have long since been exposed, but there has been little resonance of this in 
the mainstream literature. Outdated concepts of strategic culture still inform cursory 
descriptions of the assumed continuity of Britain’s sterling military performance. As a 
consequence, under-theorised analyses of British military interventions separate military and 
political decision making levels. The military level in question is invariably depicted as acting 
normally or rationally, whereas the political sphere is regarded as incorrigibly opportunistic. 
Strategic culture then functions in the background, being glorified as the ‘right way’.  
But culture is what we collectively do, good and bad, confirmed in every-day behaviour. 
Strategic culture is primarily expressed in the practices and exchanges between those involved 
in bringing security to communities. Such dynamism cannot be captured by an assumed body 
of attributes, affecting the behaviour of security communities. It becomes a temporary 
description of a discursive dynamic between discourse and practice, which influence each 
other through processes of governmentality and conceptual power. Strategic culture, then, can 
best be understood as the discursive interplay between grand strategy as a discourse and 
relevant strategic practices.  (Neumann & Heikka, 2005)  
The concept of strategic culture promises to offer causal, non-materialist explanations of state 
behaviour, but it adheres to incommensurable explanatory modes of investigation. The 
resulting weaknesses prohibit it from moving towards more interpretative approaches. This 
means it must address those issues that have until now ignored in the conceptual debate. 
These issues regard the origins, operation and analysis of strategic culture, and warrant a look 
at earlier discursive understandings of strategic culture. (Lock, 2010, p. 691)  
This article defends a version of practice theory as a discursive alternative to contextual 
strategic culture. It intends to empirically show its superiority over contextual understandings 
of culture, as well as the limitations involved. In doing so, it describes a movement away from 
congealed structure to social structures, and from discourse towards optimal agency in 
discursive practices. As a consequence the concept acquires a different purpose. It means 
asking ‘how possible’ questions of process, rather than ‘why’ questions on motives. (Doty, 
1993) To embrace descriptive strategic culture means to reject positivist assumptions of 
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causality. In order to intelligibly resolve these issues surrounding the concept it is necessary to 
place the concept of strategic culture amidst broader issues of culture and the structure-agency 
debate within International Relations Theory. The model proposed combines constructivist 
insights and practice theory within a strategic model of decision making. Having established 
the model, it will then be used with regard to the British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000. 
British forces are often said to have either a history of fighting small colonial wars, or a 
military doctrine that has continuously focused on manoeuvre and command based on 
initiative. (Mockaitis, 1990; McInnes, 1996; Pugsley, 2011) Some military analyses of New 
Labour’s intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 similarly see ‘a British military culture’ 
confirmed. (Roberson, 2007, p. 27) David Richards’ examination of the British task force 
under his command in Sierra Leone in July 2000 points the finger at inert UN bureaucracy, in 
dire need of military tempo and structure. (Richards, 2011) Similarly, Clegg has argued that 
New Labour’s subsequent operations in Iraq in 2003 took place in a stable strategic culture. 
With casualties mounting, the issue of force protection was strongly politicised for electoral 
gain, but responsibility remained in the trusted hands of the military, or so his argument goes. 
(Clegg, 2012) The immediate objection to such essentialisation is factual. When performance 
does not meet expectations, it is easy to censure those responsible for rash policy, rather than 
those who adhere to the tried and tested ways of the past. In fact, strategic cultural analysis 
ought to include such processes. 
There were no recriminations after the British military involvement in Sierra Leone, as it was 
‘a textbook success’. (Richards, 2012) It is inviting to argue for the operation as a typical 
‘British way of warfare’ solution, embedded in counterinsurgency tactics derived from 
Imperial Policing. It is easy to see this as nothing new, at least for British operations. But it 
has been argued that the operation signalled new beginnings for the British army, too. The 
two missions were ‘pregnant with lessons’ for best-practice intervention. They also brought 
on new insights on Labour policy, as well as the military decision making process. Richards 
considered them a clear example of inertia on the part of the international community, which 
had failed to exact ‘coherent and timely pre-emptive action’. (Richards, 2011, p. 271) During 
the operation, ‘[j]oint staff officers represent[ed] a purple wave of the future who are 
doctrinally aware of the need to work together for inter-service ideals. [However, s]uch 
laudable achievements reflect organizational change rather than a bottom-up initiative to 
influence attitudes.’  (Connaughton, 2000, p. 94) This meant that the innovation of joint 
operations would have to be extended to the lower service levels through practice, not just 
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organisation. (Dandeker, 2000, pp. 173-5) The view of unchanged strategic culture ignores 
these events. To paraphrase Prime Minister Blair: it may well be the custom, but should it be? 
Preference of a discursive interpretation over a conceptual explanation does not fully position 
the argument. Constructivists differ about the nature of these concepts, debating how far they 
should distance themselves from foundationalist approaches to international relations theory. 
Critical constructivists consider the constitutive nature of discursive practices to best reflect 
the process that leads to political decisions. But conscious practice assumes a very high level 
of agency, somewhat detached from structure, and therefore, meaning. At some point the 
actions of individuals and institutions lose their signifying connection to discourses, and their 
causal effect. In the end, explanations of culture for political behaviour are located in a 
cultural continuum with its own trade-offs. 
Layout of the argument and text structure 
This article argues that the concept of strategic culture must be understood discursively to 
account for the processes that drive it. Therefore it must centre on strategic practices 
concerning the use of military force. To support this, several key discursive practices that 
constructed foreign policy towards Britain’s military intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 are 
established. Against claims of a stable national strategic culture under New Labour, the case 
of Sierra Leone confirms the simultaneous contestation and confirmation of New Labour’s 
views on the use of force. Using practice theory within a critical constructivist model, 
strategic culture regains its agency as an analytical tool towards domestic decision making 
levels.             
 The argument supporting the case is divided into five sections. Firstly, a literary 
review introduces the analytical and philosophical limitations of mainstream structural 
conceptions of strategic culture. These involve the under-theorised issues of origins, operation 
and analysis. Related to this is the role of military doctrine and civil-military relations within 
the concept. Secondly, the discursive approach to strategic culture of the second generation 
is discussed as an alternative. As cultures ‘do not stand still for their portraits’, any model of 
strategic culture should address its constitutive nature. (Neumann, 2002, p. 628) Whereas the 
early discursive conceptions of strategic culture as a Gramscian hegemony recognise the 
concept as a political tool legitimising the use of force, they do not elaborate on its working as 
a product of interaction at the military-political level. Critical constructivism is shown to offer 
a bridge towards a model of agency. 
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Thirdly, the three approaches to the concept are placed within the larger cultural 
debate between structuralists and culturalists. Their contention on strategic culture as meaning 
or as practice coincides with the structure-agency debate. Abandoning this eternal 
juxtaposition for a cultural continuum makes possible an inclusive image of agency, one that 
allows a measure of causality.         
 The fourth section summarises the case for agency and its ontological limitations. 
Ultimately, agency and structure are indivisible dimensions of the same social environment. 
Practice theory can remove many objections against the analytical use of strategic culture, but 
only when the concept incorporates both dimensions. Strategic culture will be understood here 
as the discursive interplay between grand strategy as a system, and the strategic practices of 
doctrine and civil military relations.
1
 (Neumann & Heikka, 2005, pp. 14-16)   
 Lastly, we will build our model on the foundations of the previous sections. Departing 
from conventional constructivist understanding, practices are performed by conscious actors 
that operate in a ‘collective field of imaginable possibilities’. (Cruz, 2000, p. 276). This 
situates strategic culture, and eliminates the risk of mock agency through predetermined 
behaviour. This marks the last step from social structure towards agency, which is at the heart 
of the debate surrounding the concept. (Poore, 2004, p. 45)  
Case selection: Sierra Leone, ‘pregnant with practices’. 
The British military intervention in Sierra Leone fits our purposes for several reasons. First 
and foremost, the case shows three evocative examples of agency: strategic practices 
regarding the use of force, which relate directly to strategic culture. The political decision to 
intervene in Sierra Leone was constituted by events and practices preceding it. Actions by 
individuals and departments at senior levels during the first three years of the Labour 
Government have crucially altered the case for British intervention in Sierra Leone, and not 
necessarily in the way intended. While the development towards the decision to intervene 
arguably was a drawn-out political process involving many factors, actions by key individuals 
were instrumental in building consensus and crucially influencing debate. British foreign 
policy had initially ducked the crisis, subsequently mishandled it, and then saved it in a last 
ditch attempt.           
 Secondly, the case shows that instead of a collection of ‘beliefs, values and habits 
regarding the threat and use of force’ strategic culture is best understood as discourses that are 
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open to contention and politicisation. Not only do we tend to see ourselves favourably, we 
also want our ‘truths’ to be the norm. Culture is not contested because it is hard to find 
agreement on definition, but because dynamism is its very essence. Following New Labour’s 
victory under Tony Blair in 1997, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook articulated New Labour’s 
‘ethical’ foreign policy. The substance of this policy is still debated, but by now it is clear that 
‘Moralism’ was but one of four priorities of policy, competing with Atlanticism, Economic 
Liberalism, and Multilateralism. (Williams, 2005, pp. 28-32) 
 
Lastly, changed political and military understanding of the use of force at the top level 
constitute changes in strategic culture. The successful intervention marked the crowning 
achievement of two trends, one concerning military doctrinal development towards joint 
operations for ‘peace enforcement’, (Mader, 2004) the other the redemption of the New 
Labour ethical policy. There was praise all around for the British military performance in 
Sierra Leone. Operations Palliser and Barras, in July and October 2000 respectively, finally 
restored the democratically elected President Kabbah to power, after nearly a decade of civil 
war. British policy regarding Sierra Leone had made a similar learning curve. Palliser and 
Barras served as an impetus for interventionism. This attitude would later inform the 
judgment of British government officials after the 9-11 attacks. (Seldon, 2007, p. 604) 
Criticising first and third conceptual generations of Strategic Culture 
Johnston (Johnston, 1995, pp. 36-44) identified three generations of thinking about strategic 
cultures, one mechanistic, a second discursive, a third positivist. All of them are flawed in 
some way. Snyder’s landmark 1977 article on “Soviet strategic culture” defined the concept 
as ‘a distinctive and lasting set of believes, values and habits regarding the threat and use of 
force, which have their roots in such fundamental influences as geopolitical setting, history 
and political culture.’ (Snyder, 1977, p. v) Although much quoted, it fails the key test of 
operationalization. (Duffield, 1999, p. 776; Johnston, 1995, pp. 37-9; Neumann & Heikka, 
2005, p. 8)             
 The contributions on New Labour by Clegg and Sierra Leone by Roberson relate to 
such outdated first generation conceptions of strategic culture. Clegg posits that British 
strategic culture regarding methods of force protection was stable during operation Iraqi 
Freedom, in spite of major political debate between the New Labour Government and the 
opposition. Instead, ‘government became too closely involved in the planning and execution 
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of operations’. Using an early definition of strategic culture by Gray, Clegg is able to argue a 
divergence between ‘modes of thought and [of] action with respect to force, derived from the 
national historic experience’, thus not responding to his full concept of culture. (Gray, 1984, 
p. 131)  
Clegg does not question ‘whether senior officers have struck the right balance in their 
relationship with ministers and senior officials in the Ministry of Defence’,  (Melvin, 2012, p. 
26) when there is a perceived ‘temptation to act politically’ on the part of servicemen. 
(Melvin, 2012, p. 21) He elaborates on politicians micromanaging military affairs, but misses 
the emergence of politically adroit soldiers like David Richards. Plenty of words were spent 
between government and opposition about the mounting casualty rate in Iraq, and military 
men had their say on both sides. Clegg mistakenly assumes the British military culture 
remained isolated from the political level.  
Clegg invites us to discount the active debates underlying our understanding of what 
constitutes ‘normal’ use of force. We might then find the following description of the Sierra 
Leone intervention convincing. Referring to the checklist for intervention in Blair’s Chicago 
Speech (Blair, 1999), Roberson states: “In the case of Sierra Leone, the British government 
could answer yes to all the questions [raised by] The national interest and cause, the safety of 
British citizens, were easy to answer. The Lomé Peace accords had failed, so there were no 
more diplomatic solutions. The recently created JRRF provided a tailored force package that 
could achieve the military objectives. Finally, the UK was already committed to the long term 
with contributions and aid packages. The case for the military intervention fell directly in line 
with the standing foreign policy of the Prime Minister.” (Roberson, 2007, p. 5)  
This omits the changeable attitudes to the use of force. Initially, British involvement 
did not even intend to go beyond extraction of British and EU nationals being threatened by 
the Revolutionary United Front, but it ended up expanding to direct the ailing international 
efforts to stabilise the country. (Olonisakin, 2008, pp. 91-95) In Sierra Leone, British forces 
had deliberately operated separately from UNAMSIL, at 11,000 the largest UN mission to 
date. UNAMSIL was the irresolute successor to the West-African contingent of ECOMOG, 
itself tainted by Nigerian adventurism. Operation Palliser prevented a UNAMSIL rout at the 
last minute. UN Security Council members had taken their time to confront the problem, 
having long neglected Sierra Leone as a West-African problem, and then forced a debilitating 
compromise on President Kabbah at the Lome Peace Accords in July 1999. The international 
community, Britain included, had redeemed itself.  
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In his analysis of the operation in Sierra Leone Roberson presumes ‘the analysis of the 
British military culture underscores many of the reasons why the UK’s forces are well suited 
for counterinsurgency’. (Roberson, 2007, p. 25) This implies timeless knowledge about 
putting down rebellion, and harks back to the old days of ‘policing the empire’. (Clegg, 2012, 
p. 29; Cassidy, 2005) Reyifying connections between culture and behaviour, and culture and 
doctrine, ignores that counterinsurgency doctrine was continually being developed by the 
British Army. In reality, doctrine is always under development at many levels, ‘the distillation 
of experience placed in the context of the present and with an eye to the foreseeable future’. 
(Alderson, 2007, p. 7)  
Crucially, the same holds true for strategic culture. Snyder later orphaned his 
brainchild exactly for that reason, the acceptance of ‘[dubious] explanation of strategic 
doctrine in terms of national or elite political culture’. (Snyder, 1990, p. 6) Roberson’s 
quotations highlights the outcomes, but ignores the political controversy preceding and 
informing the decision to go, the inordinate size of the taskforce relative to the objectives, and 
the jumps foreign policy had made to arrive at the decision to intervene. All of these reflected 
strategic practices by ministers, field officers and soldiers, of which we will examine three. 
The common thread in both examples is that cultural explanation takes a backseat to 
‘plain old politics’ (Snyder, 1990, p. 8) Using Gray's 1984 definition of strategic culture as 
‘thoughts and actions’ Clegg does not do justice to Gray’s later insights about strategic culture 
as dynamic, elusive, and overlapping, nor his admonition not to essentialize strategic culture. 
(Gray, 2007; Gray, 1984) Concluding with a now moribund view of strategic culture by 
Snyder, Clegg understands strategic culture as a historical development, evolving when 
certain “objective conditions change”. (Clegg, 2012, p. 29.) In this respect it is worth 
repeating Booth’s powerful rebuttal of Snyder’s rejection of cultural explanations. Booth 
claimed that ‘[internal and external] ”realities” in human behaviour are in the eye of the 
beholder…we live in a created world.’  (Booth, 1990, p. 124) Clearly, strategy formulation 
cannot be divorced from the cultural dimension.  
Not only are Clegg and Roberson are extolling a reified understanding of British 
strategic culture, they understate the processes underlying the use of force. Only when enough 
time has passed, does Clegg allow these same practices to become part of the cultural 
curriculum, like the Balkans operations in the early 1990s.  (Clegg, 2012, p. 29) But key 
experiences do not lag, in fact decision makers are acutely aware of them. It follows that 
practices should be prominent aspects of their behaviour. An example of this is the 
observation that contemporary missions in Northern Ireland created an ‘in-built default 
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setting’ for actual Rules of Engagement used in Sierra Leone. (Dorman, 2007, p. 192) 
Doctrine is most significant to strategic culture when it is debated, applied, or discarded. 
Formal doctrine risks being a dead letter. 
 
First and third generations examined  
The previous applications of strategic culture show an understanding of culture as national 
and contextual. In Johnston’s oft-cited distinction of three generations of strategic culture, 
such use would classify as first-generation conceptualisation, supported by Snyder and Gray. 
(Johnston, 1995) First-generationalists consider culture key to understanding the thought 
process of particular security communities, but only contextually so. Gray welcomed Snyder’s 
concept as an indispensable addition to neorealist explanations based on ‘locally forged, but 
generically understood’ rationality. (Gray, 2003, p. 292) Following Snyder’s lead, he 
identified a national American style for security issues. (Gray, 1984)  
The first and third generations have limited their debate to the place of behaviour 
within a unitary strategic culture. The first deterministically includes it as a shaping factor of 
behaviour, the third excludes it as a falsifiable independent variable. (Poore, 2003, p. 279) 
Neither thoroughly addressed the sources of strategic culture, how it works, and the best way 
to study it. (Lock, 2010) 
First-generation definitions of strategic culture as historical national context confines its 
operationalization to generalised thick descriptions. (Poore, 2003) This prompted Johnston to 
come up with a falsifiable theory of strategic culture, using culture as an independent variable 
impacting on strategic behaviour. Dubbing himself a third-generationalist, Johnston argued 
for a ‘limited, ranked set of grand strategic preferences’ like books on a shelve. (Johnston, 
1995, pp. 36-8)  
 
‘Strategic culture is  an integrated system of symbols (i.e. argumentation structures, 
languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-
lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy 
of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with 
such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and 
efficacious.’ (Johnston, 1995, p. 36)  
Against Johnston, Gray has powerfully argued that we are all ‘encultured’ and we choose our 
books wearing our cultural lenses. (Gray, 1999, p. 135; Johnston, 1995) Any attempt to 
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separate the behaviour of decision makers from their cultural make-up will only lead to 
tautological reasoning. Johnston’s solution implies that decision makers have no influence on 
culture, like mindless ‘automata’. (Lock, 2010, p. 693; Gray, 2007, p. 8) Gray has exposed 
this fallacy confirming that ‘people make culture’. Unfortunately, his alternative of ‘a 
centuries-long dialogue between a people and its history’ is equally inoperable. (Gray, 1999, 
p. 130; Gray, 2007, p. 19; Booth, 1990, p. 126) Remarkably, while castigating Johnston’s 
efforts to define the ‘mysterious “it” of culture’, Gray still manages to exclude ‘mere 
opinions, .. fashionable attitudes, [and] shifting patterns of behavior’. (Gray, 2007, p. 11) 
 
Upon closer examination it becomes clear that first and third generation views while 
contradictory and inconclusive, represent a bedrock for promising constructivist 
interpretations. Also, few references to Snyder’s definition include his introduction that 
strategic culture is the result of a ‘socialisation process’, indicating the dynamic and 
constitutive nature of culture. (Snyder, 1977, p. v) To Johnston’s definition of strategic culture 
it can be added that interaction is a constitutive part of those strategic preferences. To 
paraphrase Gray, they are not only ‘encultured’, but ‘enculturing’. Gray admits that ‘[i]n 
practice, of course, we tend to see ourselves as we would like to be.’ (Gray, 2007, pp. 8,17) 
He comes close to a sub-national definition; 
 
‘Culture  yields us the truths, small and large, that we know should guide our 
decisions and actions. In practice, we will often ignore those truths and behave 
expediently. Our strategic culture is likely to educate us with quite powerful 
preferences. But in … a political process, we must do the best we can.’ (Gray, 2007, p. 
12)  
 
Here, Gray contradicts himself by stating culture is both all-encompassing context, and the 
opposite of rationality. His statement of expedient ‘practice versus truth’ opens the door to 
constructivist explanations of culture, but Gray refuses to enter. He retreats to his ivory tower, 
stating ‘[s]trategy is a value-neutral tool…the process by which security communities make 
the hard choices which relate military power to political purposes.’ (Gray, 2003, p. 288) Both 
Gray and Johnston gloss over the constitutive role of human practice in producing culture. 
(Lock, 2010, p. 694), Each presents ‘strategic culture’ as an objective, bounded category that 
obscures the subjective and iterative nature of the underlying political processes.  
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Their deadlocked debate with regard to the causality and analysis of strategic cultures 
derives from culturalist ambitions to make strategic culture into a counterweight to structural 
realism. (Desch, 1998) Yet, a juxtaposition of culturalist versus realist understandings of 
culture is erroneous, because neither can do without the other: there are no ‘unencultured 
realists’. (Gray, 2003, pp. 292-3) As we shall see, a more discursive definition of strategic 
culture offers a via media.  
Three generations: grappling with origin, operation and analysis 
The first and third generations have flaws regarding the origin, operation and analysis of 
strategic culture. Their account of the constitution of strategic culture is unsatisfactory. 
Johnston speaks vaguely of ‘experiential legacies’ in the origins of security communities as 
constituting strategic culture. (Johnston, 1995, pp. 29,40) Booth and Trood offer a explanation 
of cultural origins similar to Snyder’s, namely geography and resources, history and 
experience, and political structure and defence organisation. (Booth & Trood, 1999, pp. 365-
6; Booth, 1979) Gray sums it up stating ‘Germans cannot help but be German’. (Gray, 1999, 
p. 50) Such flawed thinking about strategic culture as a natural quality within a security 
community still ‘underpins virtually every study of this concept’. (Lock, 2010, p. 692) 
 Underspecified constitution also makes explaining the operation of the concept 
difficult. Against Johnston, Gray argues in favour of including behaviour, as ‘human strategic 
actors and their institutions “make culture”‘ (Gray, 1999, p. 130). Indeed, Johnston cannot 
maintain his causal separation of culture and actor, and allow agency on the part of decision 
makers at the same time. Once decision makers can reject their own cultural preference, the 
model loses its explanatory power. Practices supposedly do not themselves constitute culture, 
an untenable proposition.         
 Gray chooses deterministic arguments over an engagement with the relationship 
between structure and agency, that lies at the heart of the debate. (Lock, 2010, p. 693) 
‘[C]ommunities do not deliberately construct their cultures, strategic and other. Those cultures 
emerge and change as a kind of natural phenomena. They are the ever evolving product of the 
many efforts peoples make to explain their past, understand their present, and anticipate their 
future.’ (Gray, 2007, p. 14) While we agree with Gray on the dynamic nature of culture, it is a 
key point of this article to argue that his argument for strategic culture as an ephemeral, 
unconscious phenomenon is deterministic, making culture overly structural.  
With regard to the question of analysis, another encounter between first and third generation 
authors offers a partial answer. The Kier-Posen debate asks whether military doctrine as part 
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of national strategy is informed by organisational culture or material interest. (Farrell, 1998, p. 
409) Kier’s contribution stands as a key example of third generation work on strategic culture. 
Posen defends realist motives underlying doctrine. (Poore, 2003, p. 284n19; Posen, 1984; 
Posen, 2004)           
 Kier judiciously argues how cultural assumptions on the use of force by politicians 
and military constrained the Anglo-French war preparation prior to 1940, yet she fails on 
method. Kier makes military culture a variable between political constraints and military 
planning, assuming political cultures as constant. Her emphasis on cultural causality 
downplays functional motives that were part of military-political contestation. This follows 
from her definition of culture as ‘the set of assumptions so unselfconscious as to seem a 
natural, transparent, undeniable part of the structure of the world.’ (Swidler, 1986, p. 279; 
Kier, 1997, p. 26) Kier confuses doctrine with strategy to argue dominance of civilians over 
strategy and cultural effects, leading her to prioritise operational procedures (or practices) for 
political goals translated in military strategy. This unnecessary dichotomy opens her up to 
narrow realist criticism regarding doctrine as ‘merely techniques’. (Porch, 2000, p. 168; 
Desch, 1998, pp. 161-2)  
Both Kier and Porch evade the dynamism of doctrine, both its power to lead innovation and 
its ‘dysfunctional lag’ in implementation. (Alderson, 2007, pp. 8-9) Projected onto the 1990s, 
this tactic would have ignored that British armed forces saw “major shifts in the civil-military 
relationship, which impelled the military to adjust their thought and action more to the norms 
of civilian society.” (Mader, 2004, p. 25) Again, taking doctrine and civil-military relations as 
static entities misses the point of their constitution. Our model must incorporate them as 
constitutive processes, or practices. 
The neglected second generation: strategy as discourse.  
Constitution, workings and analysis of strategic culture remain problems for the previous 
approaches. The interpretive approach of the second generation of strategic culture partially 
addresses these issues. Taking a post-positivist approach in an unreceptive era, this work has 
been overshadowed by the Johnston-Gray debate. (Lock, 2010, p. 691)  
 Bradley S. Klein’s idea of strategic culture as a ’political web of interpretation in 
which strategic practices gain meaning’ realises a much broader conceptualisation of strategic 
culture. (Klein, 1988, p. 136; Lock, 2010, p. 687) His contributions take strategic culture 
away from the ontological and epistemological assumptions by Gray and Johnston. Klein 
takes reality as constructed, rejecting the foundational division between subject and object. To 
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him, strategic culture is a form of ideology that justifies and shields real politics. During the 
Cold War the United States of America postulated a declaratory policy of defensive nuclear 
strategy, but actively pursued an operational policy of global hegemony. (Klein, 1988, p. 138) 
Klein’s observations bring us two further building blocks, and a warning.  
 Firstly, identity is not ‘natural’ or primordial, it is constructed. Culture does not just 
shape practices, as Gray has argued; their actors derive their identity and therefore their 
interests from culture. Why people fight depends on how they think about themselves and 
their enemies. This is why political bodies, which incorporate military style and infrastructure, 
actively hegemonise the right to define legitimate uses of force. This is similar to Kier’s point 
on civilian government’s primacy on constraining domestic military power, and Lock’s on the 
communicative practices of the ‘politics of strategy’. (Kier, 1997, p. 21; Lock, 2010, p. 697) 
As Lock clarifies, military strategy must be considered a cultural practice for it to be properly 
analysed. (Klein, 1988, pp. 135-6; Lock, 2010, p. 698)     
 Secondly, strategic practices consist of material and a cultural meanings. From Klein’s 
Gramscian division of strategic culture between declaratory and operational culture, it follows 
that strategic practices like doctrine and civil-military relations will have a meaningful part 
and an operative part. Official doctrine is a public document streamlined by government 
policy discourses, but equally doctrine has to provide practical guidelines for those in the 
field. Snyder identified a Soviet declaratory policy, leading him to question the validity of 
using Soviet military doctrine as an unpolemical internal source. (Snyder, 1977, p. 8) Kier 
hinted on this duality regarding civil-military relations: ‘the military’s culture shapes how the 
organisation responds to constraints set by civilian policymakers…[and it] intervenes between 
civilian decisions and military doctrine.’ (Kier, 1997, p. 5)    
 Lastly, Klein assumes discourse to be coherent with the operation, the reverse of 
Johnston’s premise of behaviour following culture. This leads him to ignore the real 
possibility that decision makers are themselves socialised by ‘the symbolic discourses they 
manipulate’. (Johnston, 1995, p. 40) Consequently, we have to allow for mutual constitution 
of discourse and practice, structure and agent.     
Constructivists assume an intersubjective reality of mutually constitutive structures and 
agents. These shape seemingly ‘natural’ identities, and the ‘power of practice in its 
disciplinary, meaning-producing mode’. (Hopf, 1998, p. 182) Our interest in the latter, not the 
former sides us with critical constructivism. Not all constructivists are prepared to trade in 
their explanations of socially produced structures for constitutive strategic practices.
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 Conventional constructivists accept minimal positivist assumptions of practices, 
power, institutions, and norms being somehow stable. They assume categories exist and 
identities are relatively stable. (Hopf, 1998, p. 184; Katzenstein, 1996; Wendt, 1992) This 
allows them to use these as variables explaining state behaviour. Understandably, they feel 
close to the realist methodology. (Farrell, 2002, p. 72) Having wrested the initiative from 
realists with their narrow material explanations of state identity and interests, conventional 
constructivists maintain that strategic culture, although constituted, is in some way collective, 
distinctive, and stable. (Duffield, 1999, p. 770; Hoffmann & Longhurst, 1999, p. 31) Critical 
constructivists rightly disqualify this sudden amnesia, regarding causality through edified 
identities as void. Instead, they aim to uncover the power relations underlying ‘natural’ 
identities. (Hopf, 1998, pp. 183-4)        
 An example will clarify the point. From the vantage point of ‘new institutionalism’, 
Farrell makes a case for culture as shaping institutional preferences, similar to contextual 
approaches. Farrell’s ‘competitive institutional isomorphism’ informing organisational 
practices, has the same effect as Johnston’s one-way approach of ‘culture informs behaviour’. 
(Farrell, 1998, p. 412) Remarkably, Farrell persists with institutional explanations of Irish 
conventional military reorganisation after the Anglo-Irish War of 1921, in spite of his 
recognition of converging practices of resurgent guerrilla warfare and adoption of British 
administration by the Irish Government. (Farrell, 1998, p. 416)     
 It is legitimate to ask why Farrell subscribes to the constitutive nature of culture, yet 
does not criticise ‘the existence of communities such as military organisations and states’. The 
fact that such entities are maintained, while others are not mentioned, creates a red flag in 
itself. (Lock, 2010, p. 701n82) This shows that conventional constructivists risk falling into 
the determinate traps of origin, operation, and analysis as first-generationalists. 
Power relations at the grand strategic level are reflected in debates between military and 
political levels. ‘Strategic culture constitutes a set of rules regarding what may be 
communicated, and implicitly, what may not. (Lock, 2010, p. 700) Communication presumes 
shared understanding of symbols, and the political process is essential in this regard. (Lock, 
2010, p. 700)  Politics revolve around the contestation of meaning. Agents do not meekly pass 
on meanings dictated by social structures. They actively participate to manipulate this process 
in their favour. In the case of strategic culture, it means that military and political levels must 
be analysed whenever they position themselves. As Klein put it: "To study strategic culture is 
to study the cultural hegemony of state violence." (Klein, 1988, p. 136)   
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 Taking long-term cultural patterns for granted is to deny this every-day process. 
Primordialist understandings of national identity like ‘The British Way of War’ are rarely 
appropriate as there seldom is a fully homogenous population. On the other hand, even 
politicians have their memories. Generalisations will have some credibility. Befitting our goal 
of a middle ground, Cruz has suggested a ‘declaratory identity’ as an understanding of 
national identity that is neither primordialist, nor invented. Instead, she focuses on ‘collective 
fields of imagined possibilities’ in which the present is continuously contested within 
‘rhetorical frames’. (Cruz, 2000, pp. 281-2)  As beliefs are not predetermined, and subcultures 
at every level will exist, there is always a need to persuade others of the need to listen to this 
or that interpretation of past events. Actors’ behaviour must therefore be empirically 
examined. To do this, Cruz reverts to the ‘discursively explicit’, because these are observable 
and political. (Cruz, 2000, pp. 279-282) From there it is a small step to practices. 
So far, this article has embraced the critical constructivist view on identity as a dynamic of 
power and practice, to counter cultural generalisations. We will now turn to the question of 
where to locate strategic culture. Lock situates strategic culture as ‘a particular social structure 
[that] shapes the content and meaning of strategic discourse as well as what implications 
follow from the deployment of that particular discourse’. (Lock, 2010, p. 701) Prior 
knowledge will influence actors positions, but what they say and repeat will direct the debate. 
Klein implies such emphasis on practices, stating ‘widely available orientations to violence 
and to ways in which the state can legitimately use violence against putative 
enemies…[P]opular representations…become artefacts [that] render a distinct range of 
identities implausible [or plausible].’ (Klein, 1988, p. 136) We need to distinguish how 
practices relate to structures. 
Agency needs structure. The limits of conceptual power 
The ternion debate on strategic culture takes place within the larger culturalist debate on 
structure and agency. More generally, the concept suffers when it inherits the drawbacks of 
the ontology supporting it. It has been held back by positivist attempts to make it objective. 
Initially strategic culture was conceived as a secondary explanation to rational and realist 
approaches offering non-material motives of decision makers, a ‘residual label’ to be used 
‘only when all else fails.’ (Snyder, 1990, p. 4)  Reflectivist approaches fit uneasily with those 
approaches that centre on the international side of politics, and those that regard state interest 
to be defined materially.         
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 Strategic cultural debates are part of the broader debate on culture and the state, and it 
shares many of its developments. Steinmetz lauds Stuart Hall’s (1994:527) ‘emphasis on 
distinctive social groups and classes,… [instead of] culture as an integrated whole’ as a 
watershed in the understanding of the concept (Steinmetz, 1999). The unequal distribution of 
power within symbolic systems and a historicity of culture that allows fundamental changes, 
as opposed to the Herderian geographical delineation of culture. (Steinmetz, 1999, p. 6) This 
is necessary to avoid simplified national ‘ways of war’.     
 The agent-structure debate is at the heart of (strategic) culture. Hall has pointed to the 
two understandings of culture, one structuralist, and one culturalist. ‘Whereas, in 
’culturalism’, experience was the ground-the terrain of ’the lived’-where consciousness and 
conditions intersected, structuralism insisted that ’experience’ could not, by definition, be the 
ground of anything, since one could only ’live’ and experience one’s conditions in and 
through the categories, classifications and frameworks of the culture, …of which experience 
was the effect.’ (Hall, 1980, p. 66)      
 Structuralist approaches build on ideas to form a common culture defined as a ‘general 
social process: the giving and taking of meanings, and the slow development of ’common’ 
meanings’ But the understanding of culture as a sum-total of social behaviours isolates 
meanings from ‘the active and indissoluble relationships between elements or social 
practices’. (Hall, 1980, p. 59; Barnes, 2001, p. 27)  
 
Conventional constructivists consider material interests to be cultural first - constituted 
by mutually constructed institutional identities. (Wendt, 1992, pp. 399, 405) Paradoxically, 
they consider these to be relatively stable social structures. Critical constructivists rebuke both 
schools for adhering to foundationalism and accepting naturalised patterns of unobservables. 
(Hopf, 1998, p. 183) Explanation, as opposed to understanding, requires structure, but 
structure induces determinate behaviour. (Doty, 1997, p. 370) This is the problem. How do we 
account for collective experiences without making them predetermined.   
 Hall sees culture and structure as two sides of the same coin. He offers a useful 
definition of ’culture’ that reflects this duality. Culture is; 
‘both the meanings and values which arise amongst distinctive social groups and 
classes, on the basis of their given historical conditions and relationships, through 
which they ’handle’ and respond to the conditions of existence; and as the lived 
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traditions and practices through which those ‘understandings’ are expressed and in 
which they are embodied. (Hall, 1980, p. 63)  
This definition will form the grindstone to our proposed form of practice theory. Culture 
emphasises the heterogenic nature of practices, structure stresses the collective they constitute 
(Hall, 1980, p. 72); “ ’Culture’ is not ‘a’ practice; nor is it simply the descriptive sum of the 
’mores and folkways’ of societies-as it tended to become in certain kinds of anthropology. It 
is threaded through all social practices, and is the sum of their inter-relationship.” (Hall, 1980, 
pp. 59-60) 
Curtailing postivism is no invitation for an overly radical position. The views are not 
juxtaposed, but part of a ‘continuum of increasingly thoroughgoing culturalism’. (Steinmetz, 
1999, p. 27) One side is occupied by radical culturalists, who see all social objects and 
practices as cultural, ever changing constructions of meaning. This perspective favours 
behavioural contingency, irreducible to structural explanations. The other extreme regards 
culture as purely contextual, secondary to cognition. This perspective sees culture ‘set[ting] 
an overall context of constitutive rules, the ideological terrain of taken-for-granted 
assumptions, within which strategic [human] action occurs…. [which has] a certain strategic 
reasonableness (if not rationality)’. (Steinmetz, 1999, p. 27) Gray’s assumption of neutral 
strategy is a good example.        
 Taking everything to be cultural unrealistically removes materialism from the picture. 
This represents a nihilist position. Primordialist and positivist generations favour rational-
choice perspectives within a cultural context. Without a traceable concept, a falsifiable theory, 
and concise operationalization, positivist cultural causality of strategic behaviour is 
inconsequential. Reifying strategic culture is opposed by those that want to define it as 
contingent forms of meaning. Some precipitously argue that this makes interpretative 
understanding a more productive research program. (Lock, 2010, p. 690)    
 Faced with these equally unattractive perspectives, a culturalist approach that allows 
indeterminate practices to coexist within a social structure seems to be the via media that Hall 
suggested. Laitin warns against ignoring the rationality of actors; culture is ‘Janus-faced: 
people are both guided by the symbols of their culture and instrumental in using culture to 
gain wealth and power.’ (Laitin, 1988, p. 589) Any model of strategic culture must therefore 
incorporate these two sides of culture.         
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The debate in IR has so far persisted in opposing views of scientific explanation and 
interpretative understanding (Kurki & Wight, 2010, p. 21). Both views share a flawed belief 
in causality, embraced by one and rejected by the other. ‘Independent variables’ to explain 
causal relations within a falsifiable framework, is essentially the same as viewing 
‘constitution’ of ideas, structures or rules. (Kurki, 2008) Moreover, both perspectives explain 
state behaviour in terms of causality. Poststructuralists themselves often imply agency and 
structuralism in their work. (Doty, 1993, p. 389)      
 Even though reflectivists of all colours regard their approach more, or less, a-causal, 
their vocabulary is nonetheless full off causality. Instead of reasons, they focus on 
consequences and constitutions of identities. (Kurki, 2008, p. 114) Jenny Edkins, arguing 
against notions of causality in the field of International Relations, has given an example of 
humanitarian intervention where she differentiates between ‘causes, [and] political reasons or 
motivations.’ (Edkins, 1999, p. 15) Arguably, this is just another way of seeing causation, 
between ‘motivations’ and crises. (Kurki, 2008, p. 199) Kurki reverts to Aristotle’s four 
causes - material, formal, efficient and final – to construct a new basis for causality.  (Kurki, 
2008, p. 220) The four causes also interact with each other. (Kurki, 2008, pp. 207-9) 
 The Aristotelian model reminds us that we cannot ignore material factors, that formal 
causes are not merely ‘mental’ as neorealist assume, that efficient agency is always embedded 
in causal context, and that final causes are intentions, but not teleologically so. The pay-off is 
to think of causal explanation not as ‘the gathering of regularities, but conceptual explanation 
of the variety of forces that bring about regularities or observables.’ Reducing causal 
explanation to ‘mechanistic metaphors or relations of ‘independent and dependent variables is 
to overly restrict our understanding of the complex social reality around us.’ (Kurki, 2008, pp. 
210-11)            
 In particular, Aristotelian final causes can help us out of the problem created by 
conscious individual actors negating general laws. Final causes must be understood as non-
mechanistic, non-regularity bound causal forces. (Kurki, 2008, p. 226) Final causes are a 
crucial and irreducible separate cause. (Kurki, 2008, p. 222) The motivation for executing a 
practice may not correlate with the material means applied, yet express causal effect. For 
example, the size of the British intervention force did not necessarily establish prior motives 
to escalate.            
 As is the character of discursive practice, its causality works in both ways. It frees us 
from the covering law adage of cause and effect being proven through each other. Non-
conceptual causality makes strategic culture as an imagined entity unnecessary. Moreover, it 
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means we can differentiate its perceived outcomes. Most importantly, the focus on practice as 
an itinerary to agency does not preclude causality. 
Structurally informed Agency.  
All three generations of strategic culture see social structures as separate from agents. As 
Hall’s definition of culture (p.12) has shown, it is not necessary, or even desirable, to choose 
between social structures and agents. As the two tenets of social life, they both affect strategic 
culture. (Wendt, 1992, pp. 337-8)  The conventional constructivist subscription to scientific 
realism condemns them to the identified problem of social causality. Logically speaking, 
objective and powerful structures cannot coexist with subjective but autonomous agents. This 
is important, because it contradicts Wendt’s famous argument for mutually constitutive actors 
that can escape systemic anarchy. (Wendt, 1992)  
Maintaining the juxtaposition of agent and structure prevents a solution as both categories are 
highly dubious, as they are overdetermined and lack any essence (Doty, 1997, pp. 386, 387) 
They will invariably lead to ‘attributing some timeless and unexplained quality to all 
subjects’. (Doty, 1997, p. 384) As this is a problematic of strategic culture, it is better to 
analyse discursive practices. These cannot be essentialised, for they do not carry meaning or 
signification outside of discourse. (Doty, 1997, p. 377) Discursive practices assume that 
‘words, language, and discourses have a force which is not reducible to either structures or 
cognitive attributes (‘signifieds’) of social actors’. (Doty, 1993, p. 301) ‘Discursive practices 
create subject-positions, a subject being defined as a position within a particular discourse… 
[retaining] varying degrees of agency.’ As a result, a subject can only be defined relative to 
other subjects and objects. (Doty, 1997, p. 384; Doty, 1993, p. 306) 
Strategic Culture as a dynamic interplay of Grand Strategy 
Expressing strategic culture as a discursive will lift the eyebrows of realists, but it is not as 
radically critical as it sounds. It is possible to be encultured, yet retain individual choice. 
(Gray, 2007, p. 10) Gray dexterously argues that ‘[t]here may be a body of strategic beliefs 
and attitudes to which, say, most Americans would sign up. But, the many organizational 
players in policymaking and policy implementation will each have their unique take on how 
those common beliefs and attitudes should be expressed in actual strategic behaviour.’ (Gray, 
2007, p. 10)            
 We express grand strategy as a discourse, and doctrinal development and civil-military 
relations as strategic practices. (Neumann & Heikka, 2005, p. 17) Discourse here may be 
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understood as a system, or preconditions, for the formation of statements. (Neumann, 2002, p. 
630) Preconditions refer to the iteration, not definition, of meaning. Doctrine is ‘the sub-
component of grand strategy that deals explicitly with military means’ (Posen, 1984, p. 13) 
The dynamic interplay between these elements together forms strategic culture. (Neumann & 
Heikka, 2005)           
 To clarify, a synonym for strategic culture in this sense could best be ‘politics of 
strategy’ rather than a ‘century-old dialogue’. (Lock, 2010, p. 707) As culture is understood 
dynamically, the term ‘strategic culture’ can only connote a provisional description of power 
relations. This does not rule out lasting beliefs, but makes them dependent on what decision 
makers consider to be their cultural heritage, and what they do to manipulate this shared 
understanding. After all, implementation of the use of force is an exercise of ‘who we are and 
why we fight’.          
 Culture can be understood as a circuit where practice and discourse continuously 
influence each other through the application of knowledge and power. Practices incorporate 
social rules, and contingent resources. In fact, observance of discourse, and performance of 
establish practices are two sides of the same coin – they confirm each other’s power. A 
discourse as a system of meaning that commands the observance of established practices, 
possesses the Foucauldian power of governmentality. Practices can be changed, or re-enacted 
in new situations, which places them outside of the discourse. They can nonetheless be 
acceptable, once they have been understood to fit other practices, and institutionalised as an 
established practice. This ‘conceptual power’ is how social change occurs. (Neumann, 2002, 
pp. 636-7)          
 Neumann does not mention what or where strategic culture is in this model. Cruz’ 
suggestion of ‘collective fields of imaginable possibilities’ accurately describes the process of 
political contention that underlies the model. (Cruz, 2000) Rhetoric politics make explicit the 
political struggle over meaning and shared identity which dictate what options are negotiable 
and what ought to be done.         
 Strategic culture is not a monolithic entity, but is constituted at the military and 
political levels, (Kier, 1997) and, some would argue, the public level too. (Gray, 2007) 
Political decision-making sets boundaries on the responses that military organisations and 
their separate military cultures will generate. (Kier, 1997) Static, or linear, conceptions of 
strategic culture do not reflect the continuous influence of culture, or the fact that diversity is 
created by different actors. Although space does not permit its treatment here, the model 
warrants an international dimension to cover discursive practices that have interstate and 
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international reach, such as doctrinal cross-fertilisation and procurement strategies.
 
Unquestionably, ‘policy and strategy are negotiated outcomes’. (Gray, 2007, p. 25)  
The function of practices in behaviour 
So far we have examined the flawed assumptions of mainstream concepts of strategic culture. 
They can be placed on the structuralist side of the cultural continuum. Our proposition  
achieves a middle road between Weberian individualism and Durkheimian emergent 
structures that ‘are not reducible nor, therefore, explicable from those of its component 
elements –human individuals’. (Frisby & Sayer, 1986, p. 36) A fully structural concept of 
strategic culture leads to essentialised primordial explanations of strategic culture in support 
of rational theory. We cannot ignore structure, because power is socially constituted, it 
‘emerges out of order’. This actually empowers the individual member, whose power grows 
from social agreement on practice. ‘Power is shared practice’. (Barnes, 2001, p. 27n2)
 Practice theory offers a solution to ontological and epistemological problems of 
connecting ideas to explanations for behaviour. It refines the traditional Weberian idea of 
material structures, and ideational actors. (Weber, 1978; Swidler, 2001, p. 76) A focus on 
practices avoids structural determinism of ‘actors who can only recite pre-existing scripts’ 
(Sewell, 1992, p. 11). Practices lie in between the subjects of structure and agents, 
incorporating elements of both. Therefore they are products of interaction. Unfortunately, IR 
theorists have ignored practices as the key issue of the Agency-Structure debate. This is likely 
because genuinely empowered practices reconstitute determining structures that are assumed 
as stable. (Doty, 1997, p. 376)     
“Practice theory moves the level of sociological attention ‘down’ from conscious 
ideas and values to the physical and the habitual. But this move is complemented by 
a move ‘up’, from ideas located in individual consciousness to the impersonal arena 
of ‘discourse’. A focus on discourses, or on ‘semiotic codes’ permits attention to 
meaning without having to focus on whether particular actors believe, think, or act 
on any specific ideas.” (Swidler, 2001, p. 75) 
Where Hall’s duality separates the two sides, the meanings and values, and the practices 
that re-enact them, this paragraph completes the argument. The two dimensions or structure 
and agency are brought together within the concept of practice. Social rules provide a mould, 
actors choose to wield resources to sustain or alter them. This is why strategic negotiations are 
the heart of a cycle of mutually constitutive practices and discourses that embody strategic 
26 
 
culture. The public manifestation of professional military opinions on British force protection 
discussed by Clegg suggests a change in civil-military relations. These are a key element of 
strategic culture as a discursive. Without this side of the military-political dynamic any 
explanation of the broader change in attitudes to the utility of force, such as fighting an 
insurgency and the best way to force protection, becomes disjointed. In fact, after 2001 British 
counterinsurgency doctrine stayed the same, while actual practices changed. (Alderson, 2007, 
p. 9)          
 Autonomous agents and all-encompassing structure are blended together in practices. 
Sewell argues that structure can be ‘defined as composed simultaneously of schemas, which 
are virtual, and of resources, which are actual’. (Sewell, 1992, p. 13) Discourse, as a form of 
structure, becomes less important than the heavy schemas underlying it; 'deep structural 
schemas’ [that] are pervasive [and] 'taken-for-granted mental assumptions' and modes of 
procedure that actors [unconsciously] apply.’ (Sewell, 1992, p. 22) Similarly, Swidler defines 
practices as ‘routine activities of an unconscious, automatic unthought character…by 
individual actors, or by organisations’. (Swidler, 2001, p. 74) Social practices are equated to 
agency, to replace the intransigence of individual decision makers. Practices are not actors, 
but they do possess agency. They are pervasive societal structures, but at a lower level they do 
possess social procedures, or resources, and the underlying schemas that inform them.  As 
Swidler concludes, ‘[p]ractices are structures in just this sense’. (Swidler, 2001, p. 79)
 Constructively understood, structures are ’sets of schemas, and resources may 
properly be said to constitute structures only when they mutually imply and sustain each other 
over time.’ (Sewell, 1992, p. 13) People apply their material and mental assets – resources – 
to the execution of social tasks at an appropriate time – schemas. Through their action they 
reaffirm the validity of the structure – the combination of resource and schema. An email of a 
civil servant to a journalist can be helpful, courageous or illegal depending on the situation 
and the actors involved. It is entirely possible to perform a practice with other resources, or in 
different situations. ‘Resources, we might say, are read like texts, to recover the cultural 
schemas they instantiate. Indeed, texts- whether novels, or statute books, or folktales, or 
contracts-are resources from the point of view of this theory.’ (Sewell, 1992, p. 13)
 Furthermore, practice theory addresses epistemological problems of culture: its 
invisibility and its assumed power over passive actors. (Barnes, 2001, p. 17) Taking practices 
as the unit of analysis remedies the problem of connecting actors with their social 
environment. What is called ‘culture’ is found in those practices ‘that anchor other forms of 
practice and discourse because [they] enact a constitutive rule that defines a [significant] 
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social entity’, identifying a community, or a labour relationship. (Swidler, 2001, p. 90) It can 
also explain why changes in accepted ways occur, in a way that can be observed.  
 Discourses are not so much the end result of practice, but understood as the system of 
meanings that determine what is meaningful.  Epistemologically practices are easier to study 
than thoughts. This also avoids the problem of relating culture to action. (Johnston does this 
by analytically separating action from culture). Moreover, practises are action, being defined 
as ‘routine activities of an unconscious, automatic unthought character…by individual actors, 
or by organisations’. (Swidler, 2001, p. 74) This also allows a plausible explanation for 
cultural change, because ‘structures are multiple and intersecting, because schemas are 
transposable, and because resources are polysemic and accumulate unpredictably.’ (Sewell, 
1992, p. 19) Swidler adds: ‘..and most importantly because the schemas implicit in arrays of 
resources can be ‘read’ in multiple and sometimes competing ways, transformation as well as 
continuity of structures is possible.’ (Swidler, 2001, p. 79)     
 Swidler stipulates that not all practices are equally powerful, that they can be public 
and still be powerful anchors of social rules, and most importantly, that they are at the bottom 
but still anchor the larger constitutive rules that in turn make up discourses. She argues that ’it 
is the practice itself that anchors, and in some sense reproduces, the constitutive rule it 
embodies.’ (Swidler, 2001, p. 83) This corresponds to Swidler’s previous understanding of 
culture as a toolkit that shapes the formation of strategies of action, routines from which 
actors choose and pick. Cultural repertoires are built from such societal toolkits of symbols 
stories, rituals and worldviews. (Swidler, 1986, p. 273)  
Practice as conscious action 
One problem remains. Swidler identifies culture as an unconscious (Swidler, 1986), 
unthought attribute of behaviour, or ‘set of unselfconscious assumptions’. Similar to 
Johnston’s separation of culture from behaviour, she emphasises practices as ‘routine, 
unthought activities’. (Swidler, 2001, p. 74; Swidler, 1986) Such tactics smuggle 
predetermination and simple causality in through the back door, presuming everyone 
performs certain shared practices in exactly the same way. Practice cannot be its own cause 
and effect. Such assumption would risk a tautological perpetuation of system and practice. 
(Barnes, 2001, pp. 21,23n4)         
 To see individuals as empowered by a social practice departs from  mechanistic 
models where rationally or culturally prescribed individual actions add up to social power. 
(Barnes, 2001, p. 21n2) It also follows that discourse is conservatively defined as a set of 
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preconditions. To define it in Klein’s way, as an all-encompassing cultural illusion amounts to 
a pre-determined structure without agency.        
 Of course behaviour remains individual. Skill levels and material resources of 
individuals and groups are never exactly the same. It has been suggested that we should 
abandon our efforts to combine disparate individual habits into social behaviour. (Turner, 
1994) But there is no reason to give up on practices as being socially constituted. If a unit of 
cavalrymen would exchange their horses and equipment, the performance of the group would 
certainly drop significantly. Even though they have received the same drill, they will not 
understand or execute even routine tasks in exactly the same way. Again, power comes from 
shared practice. Based on this, we reject Swidler’s reading of a toolkit of fixed practices. Her 
definition of practice as an unthinking process is reminiscent of Johnston’s ranked 
preferences. Simply put, labels of tradition, routine, or the collective are inadequate reasons 
for why things are done.         
 Practices should therefore be defined as ‘socially recognised forms of activity done on 
the basis of what members learn from others, and capable of being done well or badly, 
correctly or incorrectly.’ (Barnes, 2001, p. 19) Each cavalryman is a ’competent member’, 
blessed with different skills, tools, motivations. Each knows what is required of him to make 
the cavalry perform as a fighting unit. To do so, each makes a conscious decision to align his 
resources with the others for the common goal. (Barnes, 2001, pp. 24-5) . This consciousness 
makes all the difference. It returns true agency to the debate. The implication is that structures 
can no longer be thought of as objective, or even stable. Instead they must be analysed for the 
elements that constitute them.        
Seeing practices accordingly solves cultural problems of origin, workings and analysis, as 
identified by Lock. It also corresponds with Hall’s idea of bodies of meaning, and practices as 
the purposeful, conscious expression of those meanings. Discourse is not regarded as an 
explanation in itself, but merely the temporal setting for contestation; “Because actors situate 
their struggles within a dominant rhetorical frame (Strategic Culture), political contests 
between them engender a collective field of imaginable possibilities (Grand Strategy), 
[defined as] a restricted array of plausible scenarios (Practices) of [reality and the future]. 
(Cruz, 2000, p. 277) In the vocabulary we have so far established Cruz’ elaboration could 
translate as follows: ‘Because military and politicians debate over security policy from a 
national strategy prioritising governmental responsibility, they take up subject-positions that 
engender a strategic culture, defined as strategic practices of doctrine, civil military relations 
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and diplomacy that are based on resources such as official publications and, and schemas like 
shared experience.’  
Case study Sierra Leone: practices influencing the use of force 
In perhaps the most detailed study of British political involvement in Sierra Leone in the 
1990s, Michael Kargbo uses M. Clarke’s description of the British Cabinet to characterise it 
as a grouping of several committiees and subcommittees: ‘less a machine than a network of 
well understood procedures’. (Clarke, 1992, p. 92). These are frequently left out of every-day 
policy-making. (103) This is echoed in the constructivist, radically culturalist idea of the state 
as ‘a complex and mobile resultant of the discourses and techniques of rule.’ (Steinmetz, 
1999, p. 27)  
Using practices, we can examine the machinations between different policy groups without 
reducing actors and their environment to fixed categories of government, state and diplomacy. 
Indeed, Neumann’s contributions have shown that diplomacy is a multilevel affair, and 
dynamic in its area of responsibility. (Neumann, 2002) Focusing on practices as a 
combination of resources, or skills, and schemas, we intend to show how three actors crucially 
affected the use of force as part of foreign policy towards Sierra Leone. The first case will 
show how a discourse on the use of force directs practices. New Labour’s ethical policy 
became a straightjacket when practices publicly deviated. A discourse that holds broad 
acceptance needs no enforcing. This is called governmentality. The second case shows some 
practices can fit within a diplomatic discourse but be at odds of the government discourse. 
The last case shows how the use of force as a practice has conceptual power that influences 
the discourse, and takes it further. Lastly, the three cases span a period of three years. Taken 
together they suggest that attitudes in government changed from hesitant ethical policy to a 
commitment to humanitarian intervention. The proven ability of British force projection 
operations in Sierra Leone cast its shadow to the cases belli in Afghanistan and Iraq. (Seldon, 
2007, p. 604) 
‘The constitutive elements of Labour’s foreign policy’ 
Within the discourse of humanitarian intervention, two relevant schemas can be identified, 
namely the ethical policy of New Labour, and the Peace Support Operations military doctrine 
that developed parallel with it. Between 1997 and 2000, both developed towards activism. 
When New Labour came to power in 1997, it set out to change the Conservative record on 
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foreign policy, which was tainted by their brawls with the EU and handling of the wars in 
Yugoslavia. (Williams, 2005, p. 22) Behind these familiar ideological strands of 
Multilateralism, Atlanticism, Neoliberalism and, perhaps, Moralism was a new conviction 
that globalisation required a more active approach to build democracy and stability. Foreign 
policy became the area of real differentiation. (Williams, 2005, pp. 27-8)   
 Despite Labour’s aim to become ‘a force for good in the world’, it struggled to deliver. 
Among its foreign policy innovations were new limitations on British arms exports, a focus 
on Africa and a Strategic Defense Review for the overstretched and underfunded armed 
forces. All these activities amounted to a veritable change of defence policy culture. 
(McInnes, 1998, pp. 830, 844-5; Williams, 2005, pp. 22,31) The Strategic Defense Review 
was new in three senses. It was formal, allowing an unprecedented measure of input from the 
uninitiated in the government and military. It was foreign policy oriented, not a cost-cutting 
exercise. Lastly, it gave prominence to ‘defence diplomacy’. (McInnes, 1998, p. 844)  
 The development of British doctrine during the 1990s was generally a narrative of 
successful institutionalisation and consolidation of inter-service doctrine. This pioneering 
development also brought British international leadership in developing peace enforcement 
doctrine for humanitarian missions. Sierra Leone was a successful example of 
constabulisation of military tasks. (Mader, 2004, p. 208)     
 The operations in Sierra Leone vindicated the newly developed all-service arms 
military doctrine of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force under a Permanent Joint Head Quarters. 
(Connaughton, 2000; Roberson, 2007, p. 87) The mission was also a resounding success for 
the Blair government, which had initiated a messy unilateral intervention in Kosovo the year 
before. The argument to do so was given by Tony Blair in 1999. In his ‘Chicago Speech’ 
Blair had formulated five criteria to identify when to ‘get actively involved in other people’s 
conflicts.’ (McInnes & Wheeler, 2002, p. 159) Benevolence had controversially stretched the 
limits of the legitimate use of force to include the right to intervene in states shirking their 
responsibilities.  
Cook’s ethical policy: Discourse governmentality dictates practices 
Policy and actions, in our parlour discourse and practices, need to correspond for either of 
them to be sustainable. New Labour’s legitimisation on military interventions ran counter to 
international laws protecting state sovereignty, notably article 51 of the UN Charter.  (Shaw, 
2008, pp. 1143-5) This was increasingly at odds with its multilateralist aims. (Williams, 2005) 
We can take this activist foreign policy as a practice, with moralist ideology for a schema, and 
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aims and understandings of Labour, the Cabinet and Cook as resources.    
 The views of the preceding Conservative government regarding intervention were that 
endangered expatriates warranted unilateral action, provided it was a last resort and 
proportionate. This view was at odds with on the point of intervening in sovereign states to 
protect nationals. Article 51 mandates the ‘territorial integrity and political independence of 
the target state’. Following Prime Minister Tony Blair’s 1999 Chicago Speech Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook in July 2000, the start of Operation Palliser, made public six principles 
to justify intervention in the case of ‘massive violations of humanitarian law or crimes against 
humanity.’ (Cook & Campbell, 2000) Like Blair’s five points, they all applied to Sierra 
Leone.            
 In the 1997 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Mission Statement Foreign 
Secretary Cook announced that it was high time for the introduction of ‘an ethical content for 
foreign policy [which] recognises that the national interest cannot be defined only by narrow 
realpolitik.’ This admonition for a cosmopolitan liberal internationalism was partly inspired 
by Cook’s unhappiness at receiving a seemingly unspectacular posting. Another part was 
rhetoric against Conservative and unsuccessful ‘old’ 1980s Labour policies (Williams, 2005, 
p. 18), a sign of the ‘new’ art of framing the opposition, rather than taking controversial 
positions. (Lilleker, 2000, p. 231) Lastly, its production reflected genuine and carefully 
drafted government policy.   (Williams, 2005, pp. 19-20)      
 A prime example of this difficult, perhaps naïve policy was to unilaterally, although 
selectively, restore hope to African economies ravaged by neopatrimonialism, and structural 
adjustment policies of the World Bank.  (Williams, 2005; Richards, 1996; van de Walle, 
2001) A separate department was set up to this end, weaning (budget) responsibilities from 
the foreign office. Clearly, this was not merely ‘government’ policy, but a discursive within 
the ‘network of procedures’. When the high standards contrasted with other government 
goals, some suggested to stop re-enacting such practices. (Kargbo, 2006, p. 313) In September 
2000, in the run up to the 2001 elections, and during operation Barras, several Labour 
ministers considered ‘ethical foreign policy’ was considered a ‘misrepresented label’ 
obscuring achievements. The ‘millstone’ was hung squarely on Cook’s neck by Foreign 
Office Minister Peter Hain and others. (Dodd & MacAskill, 2000) Cook’s reputation had been 
damaged by scandals that implicated his department in condoning illegal arms trade, notably 
to President Kabbah of Sierra Leone.        
 Instructively, even Blair’s ensuing public dismissal of the ‘overblown hoo-hah’ was 
followed by his unethical defence of the ends of stability in Sierra Leone justifying the means 
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of mercenaries. (The Economist, 1998; Williams, 2005, p. 82) Cook was replaced as Foreign 
Secretary after New Labour’s 2001 victory by Jack Straw. Nevertheless, ‘Blair’s government 
continued to offer ethical justifications for its foreign policies’, notably on Iraq after 2002. 
(Williams, 2005, pp. 187,209; BBC News, 2003) Far from being Snyderian ‘plain old 
politics’, this demonstrated that the discourse of clean hands was constraining British foreign 
policy to a point where practices were accumulating to present a ‘normal’ picture that was 
diametrically opposed to it. 
Penfold and the ‘Sandline Affair’: practice out of step with discourse 
Midlevel diplomatic activities are practices within the discourses of the diplomatic service 
and government foreign policy. (Neumann, 2002) Such practices can be out of step with 
social schemas. In the case of Sierra Leone such practices clearly impacted on government 
policy. The second case concerns the activities of Peter Penfold, High Commissioner to Sierra 
Leone. Penfold was a decorated civil servant with extensive diplomatic experience in Africa. 
He had been appointed High Commissioner to Sierra Leone in a few weeks before the May 
1997 coup, during which he distinguished himself. (Kargbo, 2006, pp. 96-7)   
 His actions were found to be in clear breach of UN embargo 1132, set up at British 
instigation. (UN Security Council, 1997; Williams, 2005, p. 82) ‘In 1997-…the FCO colluded 
with the military consultancy form Sandline International to bring 30 tonnes of arms and 
ammunitions into Sierra Leone.’ It led commentators to question the official stance that 
ministerial levels had not known about Sandline’s involvement. Labour’s ethical policy was 
put to the fire. (The Economist, 1998)       
 Assisting in formulation of policy is the responsibility of diplomatic missions as civil 
servants, and they operate in a high-impact environment. (British Civil Service, 2010)
2
 
Neither national interest nor individual errors are suitable to explain the behaviour of Penfold. 
The first ignores the creation of policy through practice at lower levels. The latter ignores the 
social context in which Penfold operated. In his memoires Penfold pointed to the Legg 
Report, which stated that despite ‘individual failures and judgments… most of the trouble 
originated from systematic and cultural factors’. (Penfold, 2012, p. 85; Legg & Ibbs, 1998, pp. 
1.1, 10.57) What concerns us is the schemas alluded to here.    
 Penfold has denied advocating Sandline as a suitable partner to President Kabbah of 
Sierra Leone. The Legg investigation into the Sierra Leone arms supplies, the ‘Sandline 
affair’, offers secondary evidence to the contrary. Tim Spicer, CEO of Sandline concurred for 
                                                          
22
 The earlier version of the Civil Service Code used by Kargbo (2006, p. 110) speaks of ‘formulating policies’ 
instead of ‘developing policies’. 
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the investigation that Penfold was their government spokesperson with regard to dealings with 
Kabbah. Penfold’s own defense is dubious. He correctly points to higher FCO officers who 
were in contact with Spicer at the time. On the other hand he personally discussed the 
Sandline contract with Kabbah, and agreed to liaise with Tim Spicer on his behalf. (Penfold, 
2012, pp. 54-57)         
 Coles has argued that what he called the three golden rules of civil service were at 
variance with Penfold’s maverick behaviour. In this light, it is well to remember that Penfold 
was a decorated and exceptional field diplomat, one tour short of retirement after forty years 
of service. (BBC Newsnight, 2002; Kargbo, 2006, p. 97) Acting as ‘our man on the ground’ 
Penfold proactively represented Britain in words and actions, not sitting around for detailed 
instructions – although apparently not keeping his betters adequately informed thru normal 
channels. (Kargbo, 2006, p. 99) This entrepreneurship has precedence.    
 There are precedents for this behaviour. Against those who favour the tradition of 
British Counterinsurgency methods securing the Commonwealth, it can argued that post-1945 
local colonial British officials routinely crafted problematic ‘forward policies’, perhaps even 
‘covert empires’, to further the continuity of their region within the British empire, as Mawby 
and others have shown this to be true of colonial administrators in Aden, Kenya, and Egypt. 
(Mawby, 2001, p. 75; Mawby, 2002; Satia, 2008, p. 8; Bennett, 2007, p. 158)   
 It should also be noted that the Conservatives had earlier sponsored a failed private 
military action against the rebels in Sierra Leone. (Williams, 2005, p. 229n33; Economist, 
1998) This suggests that civil servants had a rather different understanding of ethical policy, 
equating it to ‘quiet’ practice. (The Economist, 1998) Indeed, the mainstay of diplomatic 
work was commercial promotion of British interest, as Cook himself discovered upon taking 
office. (Kargbo, 2006, p. 101) For this reason, Cook wanted to get rid of the ‘establishment 
culture’ of the Foreign Office (Theakston, 2000, p. 112), which he suspected of secretiveness 
which ran counter to the more open approach New Labour and he himself favoured. (Kargbo, 
2006, p. 113)          
 Penfold advised President Kabbah to solve his lack of military support by hiring the 
British private military company of Sandline International, represented by Tim Spicer.  The 
countermanding UN resolution he disregarded, or was not told of by the FCO office, or more 
probably was ignored by both. (Penfold, 2012, p. 54) This ran counter to government policy 
which pursued a peaceful resolution of hostilities, and had pressed for sanctions and an arms 
embargo through UNSC resolution 1132 of October 1997. (Kargbo, 2006, pp. 100, 95) It has 
been suggested that Sandline was the primary source of intelligence on Sierra Leone for the 
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Foreign Office. (Kargbo, 2006, p. 100) In any case, evidence shows a culture of 
permissiveness at the FCO department that interpreted and influenced official policy wayward 
of ethics. (Kargbo, 2006, p. 102) Peter Penfold as High Commissioner was only the most 
prominent among a number of FCO and military liaison operatives in Sierra Leone who had 
had dealings with Tim Spicer and his associates from Sandline International. (Spicer, 1999, 
pp. 212-3) The FAC was not able to ascertain the level of knowledge of both sides due to lack 
of documentary evidence. For our purposes, it suffices to establish that such diplomatic 
practices were the norm and went outside of the discourse of ethical diplomatic behaviour.
 Penfold as an experienced diplomat was aware of this social schema. Using his 
resources, Penfold decided that his experience, connections and conviction meant that he 
knew better than Whitehall. Routine activities such as the ‘golden rules’ were not his 
‘anchors’. It was Penfolds’s conscious calculation regarding their observance that favours 
discursive practices. More specifically, the ‘establishment’ discourse was closer to him than 
official foreign policy. To this must be added that specific guidelines were only recommended 
after the affair by the FAC.        
 Penfold’s behaviour, when made public, caused an indictment of FCO procedures and 
official government policy that appeared to genuinely pursue a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict in Sierra Leone. Kargbo considered Penfold ‘overenthusiastic’ and neglectful of the 
rules. (Kargbo, 2006, p. 102) The official Leggs/Ibbs investigation on the Sandline Affair 
found that communications by his superiors to ministers had been ‘incomplete, inaccurate, 
indigestible’ (Legg & Ibbs, 1998, pp. para 9.29, p.89). The Foreign affairs Select Committee 
concurred on ‘an appalling failure’. It condemned ‘alternative or non-official foreign policies 
being set by officials in the field who may think they know best.’ (House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee, 1999, pp. paras 67, 55) The Legg Report placed the blame 
squarely with the Foreign office. Although ministerial levels were exonerated, a prosecution 
was deemed ‘not in the public interest.’ (Legg & Ibbs, 1998, pp. 2-3) No doubt this would 
have brought to light other discordant practices. 
All this public excoriation of rule-breaking ignored that the stand-off role of the ‘Cabinet’, an 
amalgam of ‘several committees and subcommittees that are formally secret…informal 
groupings on a ‘need to know’ basis. Cabinet only decides on policy when it is nationally 
important, or prone to attract parliamentary scrutiny.  (Kargbo, 2006, p. 103) Nevertheless, 
the Sandline Affair had boosted Sierra Leone from the doldrums to newspaper headlines 
ridiculing ethical policy, but policy priority remained low. The FAC investigation ‘attracted 
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significant media attention, not because Sierra Leone was considered important to UK 
interests but rather because it could be used to ridicule Cook’s portentously proclaimed 
‘ethical’ approach to foreign affairs.’  (Kargbo, 2006, p. 128) 
Cooks proclamation was discursive. As such, it had to be seen to guide practices in order to be 
of political value. When it did not, the discourse came under pressure to adapt. (see Kargbo 
129) FAC recommendations on procedure and workload were adopted, and Cook confronted 
‘the vestiges of imperial attitudes’ within his department. The media were critical of 
government extending foreign policy through private military companies, a fact easily 
contrasted with the proclaimed ethical policy.  (Kargbo, 2006, p. 133) Indeed, while Labour 
had denied Kabbah’s 1999 request for British operational control of the Sierra Leonean Army 
(specifically that Brigadier Richards would remain there), it had maintained British officers in 
an unofficial capacity. (Kargbo, 2006, p. 133) This referred to the fifteen official British 
advisors, and the seventy British soldiers training the Sierra Leone Army within the IMATT 
program. (Lewis, 2004, p. 165) Overall, the fall-out from the ‘Sandline Affair’ influenced 
policy making. (Kargbo, 2006, p. 129) Practice did inform discourse, but indirectly. Even 
though the media did not call for intervention in Sierra Leone, the government sustenance of 
its ideology of ethical policy meant that unofficial use of force could no longer be legitimised. 
From now on, New Labour had to perceivably practice what it preached. 
Richards’ gamble: conceptual power of practices 
Practices can go against the grain of normal custom, but as the third case shows, but they can 
also function as a catalyst for new discursives. Brigadier Richards headed the operational 
liaison and reconnaissance team that arrived in Freetown, Sierra Leone on 6 May 2000, to 
prepare a non-combat evacuation operation (NEO) for around three-hundred nationals there. 
He immediately requested release of the spearhead element of the maiden Rapid Reaction 
Force. (Connaughton, 2000)     
An armada of ships, aircraft and infantry men was released within forty-eight hours. We can 
only speculate about the reasons for the inordinate size of this ‘evacuation force’, but the size 
appears to have been an military overestimation, likely based on recent abductions of UN 
soldiers by the Revolutionary United Front. (MacAskill & Norton-Taylor, 2000)  Incidentally, 
Penfold recounts that he had helped evacuate nearly four thousand evacuees from Freetown 
without such force three years earlier. (Penfold, 2012, p. 182) Richards as acting military 
commander decided on the spot to extend his brief of quickly extracting British nationals to 
36 
 
providing full military support for the Sierra Leonean government. (MacAskill & Norton-
Taylor, 2000) This pitted his powerful force against thousands of RUF rebels, who had 
controlled much of the Sierra Leonean landscape for many years.  
 “The pragmatics of the operation dictated that the British army secure a suitable 
exit point – Lungi airport was the obvious choice. Foreign Minister Peter Hain later 
told the House of Commons’ Foreign Affairs Select Committee that this entailed 
securing ‘the airport and its perimeter because you do not secure an airport in this 
kind of operation unless you are able to have a wide deployment area, perhaps at 
least four miles around.’ “ (Williams, 2002, p. 156) 
Having personally guaranteed British support to President Kabbah without conferring with his 
superiors at the Ministry of Defence, Richards energetically went to work. (Little, 2010) ‘It 
became clear to me that such a force could achieve much more than a NEO if we were able to 
stiffen the resolve of the better UN contingents,… the [Sierra Leonean Army] and the 
Kamajors [loyalist tribes]…’ (Richards, 2011, p. 266) Mobile patrols of 1 and 2 Parachute 
Regiment were pushing inland to engage the RUF rebels. (Lewis, 2004, p. 177) 
“[O]n 17 May British paratroopers and Nigerian troops killed four rebels about 20 
miles from Lungi Airport. This incident sparked a series of debates not only about 
the risk to British soldiers but also about the nature of their mandate in Sierra 
Leone. (Williams, 2002, p. 154)  
From the divergence in troop location it will be clear that Richards purposely picked a fight 
with the RUF, which was obviously outgunned in all dimensions by his amphibious force. 
(Connaughton, 2000, p. 93) What was  a forward Para ambush at Lungi Lol , 30 miles east 
from Freetown. It estimates RUF casualties conservatively at fourty killed out a hundred and 
fifty rebels. (Lewis, 2004, p. 178; Williams, 2005, p. 229n37; Dorman, 2007, p. 189) It is 
clear that this crucial battle was a result of British aggressive patrolling, something reflecting 
the operational choice made by Richards, not the RUF.     
 Richards was risking severe criticism and demotion. He did not exaggerate when he 
commented years after; ”If it had gone wrong, they'd have cut me off at the knees." Richards 
claims to have used the media to bypass the chain of command to get the ministerial level to 
grasp that ‘..with a little robustness, we could make a difference’. (Little, 2010) He was 
referring to top-level political sensitivity to international objections that might follow from 
what was nominally an illegal and unilateral intervention. It has to be emphasised that 
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President Kabbah had earlier requested the British government such assistance, and that the 
UN was already present with the ineffective UNAMSIL. Another political problem of the 
blanket arms embargo had been lifted to exclude the Sierra Leonean government through 
resolution 1171. (UN Security Council, 1998) Ten days after his decision to stay, Richards 
received clearance from London. (Penfold, 2012, p. 182) 
Obviously unaware, Foreign Secretary Cook was hesitant on 8 July. In the Lower House he 
declared continued British commitment to stability and peace in Sierra Leone, but refused to 
go further than protection the airport as a supply line for the UN mission, and evacuation of 
British citizens from Freetown. (Cook, 2000, pp. 520,523-4) On the other hand, sending in 
mercenaries now, would be ‘nothing but a menace’. (Cook, 2000, p. 525) The government 
was clearly set on a ‘carefully, carefully’ approach towards the use of force in Sierra Leone.
 Richards’ call was a case of personal judgment against the dominant political norms of 
risk aversion and protocol, and the military norms. In so doing he generalised his prime 
minister’s claim of exceptionality in the Kosovo humanitarian intervention of 1999. 
(Williams, 2005, p. 175) The success of operation Palliser and the rescue of soldiers from the 
RUF in operation Barras in September 2000 did not conceal that Britain remained alone with 
the US in advocating unilateral humanitarian intervention. (Williams, 2005, p. 172.) As Blair 
put it controversially in 2004, after the invasion of Iraq: ‘This may well be the law, but should 
it be?’ (Blair, 2004)          
 Common reasons given for the British intervention were saving British nationals, 
ending humanitarian suffering, defending democracy, or supporting the feeble UNAMSIL 
mission. (Kargbo, 2006, pp. 297-313) We should relegate these for a stronger reason, the 
credibility of the Blair doctrine that fully warranted British intervention in the conflict in 
Sierra Leone. To save only British lives would have debilitated Labour’s foreign policy. 
Britain was head of the policies had helped introduce mercenaries to the conflict, dictate an 
unequal peace agreement in Lome and broken an arms embargo of its own making. Combined 
with the 1997 FCO mission statement, this was impossible to ignore. (Kargbo, 2006, p. 312) 
Once success had been assured, the government was quick to capitalise. The decision to post-
date Richards’ decision to escalate was defended on 15 May 2000 by Defence Secretary 
Geoffrey Hoon, referring to the rapid deployment concept as intended in the Strategic 
Defence Review. (Hoon, 2000, pp. 23-28)       
 This brings us to the military discourse that was in effect, the implementation of 
doctrine. The military norms, for our purposes equated to the British doctrine of Peace 
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Support Operations, had developed after the Strategic Defence Review of 1997. (Williams, 
2005, p. 177) Peace Support Operations ‘fulfilled the idea of doctrine in its truest sense – to 
provide fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of 
objectives and at the same time to stress common sense and judgement in application’. 
(Mader, 2004, p. 227) 
The key change that PSO doctrine established was to synthesise warfighting and 
peacekeeping. The new doctrine described the idea of peace enforcement as follows: 
‘Peace enforcement operations are coercive operations required in the absence of 
consent, or at least in the expectation of one, or all, of the parties failing to comply 
with agreed conditions. Peace enforcement  will be necessary when the commander’s 
estimate deduces that peacekeeping techniques alone cannot put an end to human 
rights violations and achieve the specified end-state.’ (Mader, 2004, p. 224) 
By deciding to escalate, Richards ignored the specified end-state of a NEO. Instead, he let 
doctrine work for him. This was quite unlike some previous British commanders in 1990s 
crisis zones. (Smith, 2000) This is a double example of practice. Resources adapted the formal 
(social) rules of the practice of doctrine. By pledging British military support to President 
Kabbah Richards also made de facto policy in the absence of the British Government. The 
outcome shifted the balance of civil-military relations, and  confirmed the moral (though not 
legal) justification of ethical intervention in the years ahead.    
 Put simply, practice forced the discourse. Even in May of 2000 there was no 
agreement on the extent of military force, or the ’objectives after evacuation of British 
nationals’. (Kargbo, 2006, p. 105) It shows in the many stated reasons for the intervention. 
They were not simply evidence of an international humanitarian norm, or just a result of 
‘Blair’s Wars’, but a ‘tapestry of imperatives which Britain could not just ignore’. (Kargbo, 
2006, p. 298; Kampfner, 2003) It is more interesting to help trace the varying importance of 
those reasons over time. Saving expatriates, or Sierra Leoneans was only part of the 
explanation, Labour’s advocacy of democracy and multilateralism was another. The timing 
was best explained as an attempt to reconcile the pressing ethical foreign policy and Britain’s 
record on Sierra Leone, alluded to earlier, and support for international stability more 
generally. Obviously, Robin Cook now strongly favoured shoring up government policy 
regarding Sierra Leone. (Kargbo, 2006, p. 312)       
 We may ask ourselves whether the actions of one man can really reflect the whole of 
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government. Perhaps Sierra Leone was special in this regard. Referring to the British single-
command system, Roberson points out Richards was more powerful than his official 
subordination to the Sierra Leonean Government implied. ‘In reality, the system placed the 
British commander in a position where he could directly influence the Sierra Leone Ministry 
of Defence. Additionally, by working in concert with the British High Commissioner, the 
British commander could influence all the [Sierra Leonean] departments.’ (Roberson, 2007, p. 
81) Likewise, Richards has sternly defended Penfold, stating that without Penfold’s work, the 
popular attitude would not have supported the British presence. (Penfold, 2012, p. Foreword)
 Concerning practices of civil-military relations, the changed strategic environment of 
the 1990s required doctrinal reorientation, as well as adaptation to domestic pressure on 
military institutions, procedures. (Mader, 2004, p. 70) Sierra Leonean intervention is 
indicative of both the doctrinal development towards joint interservice expeditionary 
operations, and the responsiveness of the military operational level to the exigencies of 
politics, media and the public at large. (Mader, 2004, pp. 187,207) Richards’ actions reflect a 
keen sense of the requirements of ‘modern soldiering’, skills no doubt contributing to his 
promotion to Chief of the Defence Staff in October 2010.      
 We can see how the distinction between political organisation and military culture is 
artificial. Richards’ choice to escalate was not derived from doctrine. He could have fallen 
back on new doctrine demanding that the force be impartial. In fact the numerically strong 
UNAMSIL force adopted taken a neutral peace keeping role when their UN mandate allowed 
them to enforce peace. (Dorman, 2007, p. 187)      
 In terms of strategic culture, the main point must be that it reflects the interplay of 
discourse/Grand Strategy, and practices/Doctrine/Relations. As such it shows a convergence 
of military and political policies. The doctrinal development, sketched broadly from Wider 
Peacekeeping and British Defence Doctrine  to Strategic Defence Review and Peace Support 
Operations , interacted with New Labour’s political evolution from quiet diplomacy to 
multilateralism and interventionism. Although Sierra Leone was clearly an exceptional case, 
the actions of a diplomat and a military commander engaging in each other’s hemisphere may 
not be as excentric as commonly assumed.  
Conclusion 
This article has shown the validity and merits of a discursive approach to strategic culture 
based on the dynamic of practice and discourse. Earlier models of the concept are crucially 
flawed. Static contextual models can only respond to change by making definitions even more 
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inclusive, to the point of methodological nihilism. The first and third generations with their 
implicit aim of national or systemic explanations of non-material interests are poor models. 
The hegemonic discursive of the second generation does not engage with operationalization 
leading them to ignore socialisation of actors.      
 Strategic culture as a set of discursive practices equates to grand strategy, and  the 
practices of doctrine and civil military relations. Using strategic practices as a medium of 
conscious agency between actors and their social environment solves problems of 
constitution, operation and analysis. Culture no longer has to be a generalised, bounded entity 
in order to have conceptual value based on deductive-nomological causality. Contingent 
resources make it possible to explain anomalies against social rules, and therefore, change.
 The case of Sierra Leone has shown that practices and discourse mutually constitute 
each other. New discourse may lack governmentality. This leaves unanchored practices at 
lower levels at odds with what is regarded as the norm. In the case of High Commissioner 
Peter Penfold such practices nevertheless impacted on those who maintained the new 
discourse, notably Robin Cook.       
 Practices in turn possess conceptual power. Commander Richards conduct forms an 
excellent example of this. His decision worked at the levels of doctrine and civil-military 
relations, and caused a lasting change in government attitudes towards unilateral military 
intervention. Causality here can be understood in Kurki’s Aristotelian senses of formal 
meaning, and final intentions. (Kurki, 2008, p. 220)     
 Reenlisting causality within discursive practices means reflectivists also have to 
confront their own assumptions of non-causality. Another consequence is the nature of 
strategic culture which now holds no bounded meaning, but merely describes discursive 
processes.           
 Such processes are rhetorical and political in a broad sense, and centre on the 
contestation of policies by actors whose interests depend on their constituted identities. Even 
the cursory case study presented here gives ample evidence of this. Depending on the social 
schemas, and more importantly the resources they wield, their input will affect the accepted 
view of the use of force. In so doing they reflect strategic culture.    
 Practices shape political discourse, that then made possible other practices. Such a 
dynamic is much better suited for foreign policy questions. It is also much more adaptive to 
networking organisations and international influences, without jeopardising the state as a 
functioning body. The international aspect has not been covered by this examination. In the 
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